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1. Introduction 
This draft is a very preliminary and partial exposition of the state of our work on 
an approach to the behavioral classification of exchange rate regimes.  Its purpose is to 
share our initial ideas with other researchers in this area and to get feedback. The best 
ways of classifying regimes are likely to vary, depending upon the purpose.  Our primary 
purpose in developing this approach is the study of the relationships between exchange 
rate regimes and currency crises as a part of a larger study directed by David Leblang and 
the latter author on the political economy of exchange rate regimes. 
In recent years, there has been great interest in developing classifications of 
exchange rate regimes that go beyond the official designations of regimes reported by 
national governments to the IMF.  The recent research in this area has been devoted to 
behavioral classifications based explicitly or implicitly on the idea of considering to what 
degree governments respond to exchange market pressure with official intervention 
versus allowing the exchange rate to adjust.  Our approach is similar in spirit but we 
argue that the previous efforts have not given sufficient attention to the microanalytic 
foundations of the measures and that this has led to problems.   
We particularly highlight three types of problems.  One is the inappropriateness of 
using standard deviations or variances when there are trends in the data such as would 
occur under crawling pegs or discrete breaks such as occur with adjustable pegs.
1  In such 
circumstances we need more than one parameter to describe regimes.  The second is that 
the concept of the propensity to intervene in the face of exchange market pressure is 
clearly defined only in the case of intervention that leans against the wind (with fixed   3
rates being complete leaning).  Quite a number of observations of reserve and exchange 
rate changes have the wrong signs, however.  Variance ratios, for example, pay no 
attention to this problem.  Ways of dealing with wrong sign observations are discussed 
but these does not appear to be any one best method.   
The third issue is the extent to which exchange rate policy is mutually determined 
with monetary policy.  Just as a preannounced crawling peg or band may differ 
substantially from one based on ex post adjustments (in a study on exchange rate based 
stabilization, Martin, Westbrook, and Willett (1999) find that the former is more prone to 
crises than the latter), so also would it make considerable difference whether intervention 
is systematically tied to domestic monetary policy.  While not yet incorporated into our 
empirical work we believe that for the study of currency crises the degree to which 
exchange rate market intervention is sterilized or not should be quite important (See 
Willett (2002)). 
There is a fairly large literature on the classification of exchange rate regimes for 
other proposes (See table 1 for the summary of empirical studies on exchange rate 
classifications).  Initially, considerable use was made by researchers of the official IMF 
classifications of exchange rate regimes, but the IMF’s original coding was soon 
recognized to be subject to serious problems of two kinds.  First, these classifications did 
not distinguish among all of the major different categories of exchange rate regimes that 
are relevant for research.  
A second problem was that the IMF’s coding was based on national government 
statements of their exchange rate policies and these official descriptions often different 
greatly from the actual policies that governments pursued.  For example, a number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 This problem is also addressed in Calvo and Reinhart (2002) on footnote 5 (p.384)   4
countries that officially classified themselves as having floating rates in fact managed 
their exchange rates in ways identical to narrow band pegs.
2  
  Increasing recognition of this measurement problem has led to two types of 
responses.  One alternative to the original IMF coding is a new set of more detailed 
classifications published in 1999 by the IMF.  These are far superior to the old IMF 
system, both in the delineation of categories of regimes in a more analytically useful 
manner and in categorization based on the best judgments of the IMF’s country experts. 
See table 1 for the categories
3 
The other alternative, developed primarily by academic researchers, has been to 
develop behavioral measures of exchange rate regimes based on the actual behavior of 
exchange rates and/or official intervention (typically proxied by changes in international 
reserves).  A prominent example of this approach is the work of Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) who consider the variability of nominal exchange rates, international reserves, and 
interest rates in order to evaluate whether or not official classifications are useful in 
practice.  They find evidence that the variability of reserves and interest rates is high 
relative to the fluctuations in the exchange rate.  Their conclusion that in many cases 
                                                 
2The Philippines during 1996 is one of these examples.  In practice the Philippines’ bilateral exchange rate 
between Philippine Peso and Dollar moved within a narrow range from Peso 26.17 to Peso 26.29 during 
1996. 
3 Unfortunately in the only version of the new IMF classifications to be published so far (as reported in 
World Economic Outlook 1997 section IV Developments in Exchange Rate Arrangements and Markets and 
in IMF Annual Report 1999), a few of the categorizations are open to question.  For example, Brazil (as of 
Dec 31,1997 ) was classified under “Pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands” category (Real$0.97-
Real$1.06/US$).  However, in practice its regime seemed more like a crawling peg.  The nominal rate was 
devalued at a rate of roughly 0.6 percent per month from the end of 1996 and the end of 1998.  China (as of 
Dec 31, 1997) was classified under “Pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands” (+-0.3%) category.  
However, in practice, it seems like it could also be classified under “convention fixed peg arrangement 
(including de facto peg arrangements)” category.  The distinction between these two categories does not 
seem clear.  Another example is Pakistan (as of April 1999) was classified under “managed float” category.  
However, in practice its regimes seems similar to a peg to the dollar since the exchange rate was constant 
during the first four month of 1999 and subsequently devalued in a large step.  After that the rate moved 
within a narrow range from (Rupees 51.69-51.78/US$).   5
central banks are trying to stabilize the exchange rate is undoubtedly correct, but in 
classifying currency regimes the behavior of nominal exchange rates and foreign reserves 
should be related to the concept of exchange market pressure.
4 Where exchange market 
pressure is high, both exchange rate and reserves may show considerable volatility.  In 
contrast, where pressure is low, both may show little variability. As we illustrate below, 
while the reduced variability of the Korean Won in the recent period has been widely 
interpreted as reflecting substantially increased management of the exchange rate, our 
analysis casts some doubts on this assumption. 
Our analysis and comparisons with the classifications of other suggests that in 
many cases it is difficult to judge the correctness of particular classifications.  There are 
frequently substantial gray areas.  This turns out to be particularly important for 
interpretations of the role of exchange rate regimes in the Asian crisis.  Many of the crisis 
countries were practicing neither the classic narrow band adjustable peg of Bretton 
Woods (Thailand is an exception) nor highly flexible rates, nor announced crawling 
bands.  Countries such as Indonesia and Korea officially stated their regimes as managed 
floats but in practice followed forms of unannounced crawling bands.  Depending on 
whether one classifies these as more pegged or more flexible, one can find that pegged 
rates did or did not significantly contribute to the Asian crisis (see Nitithanprapas, 
Rongala and Willett (2002).  Because of the limited degrees of freedom and ambiguities 
of classifications, we believe that the only strong conclusion one can draw from the Asian 
crisis about the relation of exchange rate regimes to currency crises is that moving from 
                                                 
4 Later in their paper Calvo and Reinhart present a model in which policy credibility is reflected in second 
rather than first moments.  They use this to derive an index of exchange rate flexibility based on the ratio of 
the variance of the exchange rate to the sum of the variances of interest rates and reserves.   6
the dead center of narrow band adjustable pegs to de facto crawling bands was 
insufficient to protect countries from currency crises in that instance. 
 
A more appropriate measure of the flexibility of the exchange rate regimes is the 
ratio of currency market pressure taken on changes in reserves versus changes in the 
exchange rate; what we call the propensity to intervene.
5   A number of studies have 
made use of this basic idea to construct behavioral indices of the degree of exchange rate 
flexibility using relative volatility ratios (See table 1 for the summary of these studies).
6 
These studies vary in a number of (likely minor) technical details such as the use of 
average absolute changes versus standard deviation and variances, the normalization for 
reserve changes, and the exchange rate measures used.  Probably more importantly, 
however, almost all of the measures used share two major problems – they fail to deal 
with the problem of trends
7 and they do not relate their statistical measures directly to the 
concept of exchange market pressure (Waymark [1997] is an important exception).
8 
                                                 
5 Changes in reserves are an imperfect proxy for official intervention in the foreign exchange market, but 
they are the only one available for a substantial number of countries. See Calvo and Reinhart (2002) p.388 
and Ghosh et al (2002) for discussions of this problem.  There is also the issue of what exchange rate to 
use.  While some applications have used average exchange rates, most have focused on bilateral exchange 
rates against the dollar or another international currency such as the French franc for a number of African 
countries or the German mark (now the Euro) for many Central and Eastern European countries.  Our 
initial focus will follow this latter approach, but we plan to supplement this with the use of composite 
exchange rate indices such as the IMF’s measure of effective exchange rates where they are available.  We 
will also do a much more detailed analysis for several sample countries where more than one international 
currency many be relevant such as the dollar and the DM for countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, 
and Turkey, and the dollar and yen for some Asian countries. 
6 See Al-Marhubi (1994), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998), Glick, Kretzmer, and Wihlborg (1995); 
Haussman et al  (2001), Hernandez and Montiel (2001), Holden et al (1979), Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2000a)(2000b), Domac and Peria (2000), and Porison (2001) 
7 The exception here is Glick et al (1995) which looks at unanticipated variations in reserve and exchange 
rates.  Their statistical measures for distinguishing between anticipated versus unanticipated change 
roughly corresponds to detrending the data.  Their purpose in this paper was to look at the informativeness 
of alternative exchange rate regimes. 
8 Another important approach is the enormous project by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).  This gives a detailed 
history of changes in exchange rate regimes for a large set of countries for most of the post war period.  In 
addition to the careful intrayear dating of shifts in regimes, this study makes an important conceptual   7
II.  The Problem of Trends 
It is well known that in the presence of trends the standard deviation/average 
absolute changes can give a very misleading picture of variability.  For example, when 
the rate of crawl is accelerated or decelerated over time, the standard deviation of 
detrended change in exchange rates will not equal to the standard deviation of change in 
exchange rates.  For example, Argentina had a de facto decelerated crawling peg during 
1979- 1980.  While the standard deviation of change in exchange rate is 1.3, the standard 
deviation of detrended change in exchange rate is 0.6.  The average absolute changes also 
give a wrong picture of variability in the presence of time trend.  For example, in a case 
of perfect steady depreciation, the average absolute detrended change in exchange rate 
will be lower than the absolute change in exchange rates.  Brazil had almost a perfect 
steady depreciation during 1995-1998.  Without trend, the average absolute change is 0.6.  
The detrended average absolute change is reduced to 0.09. For many countries, there are 
substantial trends in exchange rates and/or reserves.  In such instances standard variance 
ratios can be highly misleading and we need multiple parameters to characterize 
exchange rate regimes – the trend parameters and the coefficient of the propensity to 
intervene with respect to deviations from trend. 
III.  Propensity to Intervene as the Ratio of Exchange Market Pressure Taken on  
Reserves 
                                                                                                                                                 
contribution by distinguishing between unified regimes of various forms of pegs or managed floats and 
those cases where controls have led to major parallel or black markets.  They also distinguish between 
floating rates and the free falling rates that occur under inflation.  In combination these innovations offer 
very different views of changes in the prevalence of different exchange rate regimes over time and of the 
relationship between exchange rate regimes and growth and inflation.   8
The concept of exchange market pressure assumes that intervention is used to 
limit exchange rate fluctuations.  The propensity to intervene is the degree to which 
authorities allow pressures in the currency market to move the exchange rate versus 
intervening to damping its movement.  Thus if there is downward pressure on a currency, 
the authorities under a fixed rate, would buy domestic currency in the foreign exchange 
market, i.e. sell international reserves, in order to keep the value of the currency constant 
(i.e. propensity to intervene of one) or under a completely free float let the currency 
depreciate with no intervention (propensity of zero).  Some combination of the two 
implies a coefficient between zero and one.  The same holds in reverse for upward 
pressures on a currency, i.e. the authority would do nothing or sell domestic currency 
thereby gaining international reserves.   
With a managed float or some form of movable peg, the authorities could choose 
a mix of response by intervening to take some but not all of the pressure off of the 
exchange rate by channeling it onto changes in reserves.  Such leaning against the wind 
could be light or heavy and steady or sporadic.  By looking at the ratio of changes in 
exchange rate to changes in reserves, we have a continuous variable index of the 
propensity to intervene in the foreign exchange market that varies between zero and one.
9 
  There is no analytically clear guideline for drawing the boundaries between heavy 
or high and light or low propensities to intervene.  Initially we plan to experiment with a 
three-way classification of heavy, light, and intermediate, with the dividing line being 
drawn in part by how the estimated coefficients correlate with cases where there is wide 
                                                 
9 Our index of the propensity to intervene is one minus the degree of exchange rate flexibility.  The degree 
of exchange rate flexibility is the absolute percentage change in exchange rate divided by the absolute 
percentage change in reserves plus the absolute percentage change in the exchange rate.   This index is   9
spread expert agreement that heavy or light management is being practiced.  One issue 
we will investigate is the degree to which the distinction in the new IMF classification 
between managed and independent floats corresponds to heavy versus lightly managed 
floats. 
In interpreting the economic meaning of the intervention coefficient, one faces the 
same problem as for the relative weights of the variables in the construction of the indices 
of currency crises (discussed in section four below).
10  In each case, what one would like 
to have is the slope of the excess demand curve for foreign exchange.
11  Since reliable 
estimates for the slope and shift coefficients do not exist for a broad sample of countries 
and in addition are likely time varying in important ways, we cannot interpret a 
coefficient of 0.5 on the propensity to intervene as being the true mid point on the scale.  
This would be true only if the elasticity of the excess demand schedule is such that a one 
percent change in the exchange rate would have the same effect as a one percent changes 
in reserves as occurs in the strong form of monetary models.
12  The comparison of 
                                                                                                                                                 
similar to Popper and Lowell (1994)’s methodology except that their index has a range of negative infinity 
to positive infinity and they do not consider time trends in calculating the index. 
10 Of course, using indices constructed from the same variables on both the right and left hand sides of our 
regressions raises econometric concerns, although our preliminary analysis suggests that this may not be a 
major problem.  In the crisis index, the variables are added together while in the regime index their ratio is 
taken.  We do need to investigate, however, to what extent, if any, the ratio of the variables is a function of 
the size of the pressure index.  We have reason to believe that at least in some instances this will be the 
case.  Consider, for example, the case of a wide band.  With the exchange rate is in the center of the band, 
we would expect the propensity to intervene be low while close to one of the edges of the band we would 
expect the propensity to intervene to be high.  We plan to test for such relationships in a subset of our 
sample. 
11 See Eichengreen et al (1994), Waymark (1997), and Nitithanprapas (2000).  For interest rates the 
relevant measure is the size of the shift in the excess demand curve for a unit changes in the interest rate.   
12 In a strict monetary model such as Girton and Roper (1977) used to introduce the concept of exchange 
market pressure, the mid point of the degree of flexibility would be 0.5 because under the assumptions of 
that model sterilized intervention would have no effect.  (Sterilized intervention occurs where the domestic 
monetary effects of the intervention are offset by government actions).  With unsterilized intervention there 
will be an equivalent effect on the domestic money supply and prices in the strict monetary model.  Despite 
some initial support the weight of subsequent empirical research has shown that the pure monetary model is 
much too restrictive.  (See for example, Isard (1995).  Thus we propose to use a model free specification 
and test for the sensitivity to different parameter values   10
coefficients across countries makes the weaker but still heroic assumption that while the 
excess demand elasticity is unknown, it is the same across countries and time. 
An advantage of this approach is that we can obtain a ratio of changes in 
exchange rate to changes in reserves each month, allowing us to investigate changes in 
regimes on an intra year basis.  Most other methods have been used only to provide 
classifications for annual or longer periods.  Of course there may be a great deal of 
variability and/or noise in the monthly ratios.  Typically we would look at an average 
over longer time periods (along with its variance) but plots of the ratios should be quite 
helpful in classifying shifts in regimes and may be especially useful for investigating 
mild changes in regimes such as changes in the slopes of crawling peg regimes.  
A problem of using the variance ratio measure is that it will misclassify adjustable 
peg exchange rate regimes when there is a substantial change in parity.  When exchange 
rates are pegged and then largely devalued during the period of consideration, the 
measured variances of the exchange rate changes will be high even if there is a narrow 
band around each parity.  In such circumstances, variance measures will yield high value 
on the degree of exchange rate flexibility index.  This is similar to the problems of 
standard deviation and variance measures in the face of trends.  Clearly we cannot always 
accurately classify degrees of exchange rate flexibility with just one parameter. 
For the characterization of parity regimes with trends in the exchange rate, it is 
necessary to use at least two parameters to capture both in the rate of crawl and the width 
of the band around parity.  Levy-Yeyati and Strurzengegger, LYS (2000) show awareness 
of this problem.  They divide the exchange rate regimes into 5 groups: inconclusive, 
flexible, dirty float, crawling peg, and fixed according to the behavior of average   11
percentage changes in the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of exchange rate changes, 
and the volatility of foreign reserve changes. Under purely fixed exchange rate regimes, 
there will be low average percentage changes in the exchange rate, low volatility of 
exchange rate changes, and high volatility of reserve changes.  On the other extreme, 
under purely flexible regimes, there will be high average percentage changes in the 
exchange rate, high exchange rate volatility, and low reserve volatility.  Under crawling 
peg regimes, there will be significant changes in reserves and exchange rates.  However, 
the incremental changes in exchange rates are steady.  Under dirty float regimes, there 
will be high incremental changes in exchange rates corresponding with high volatility of 
changes in exchange rates and reserves.  For countries that have low volatilities in those 
three variables, their exchange rate classification cannot be decided.   
In addition to the problem of time trend considerations discussed earlier, a 
disadvantage of LYS classification is that the wide band crawling peg cannot be 
distinguished from dirty float regimes. In addition, their classification does not address 
the problem that rate of crawls may change over time.  
Even though LYS  provide a classification used for empirical work on exchange 
rate regimes, the limitation of its classification as well as IMF classification for the study 
of currency crises  is that the coding of the year before the regimes changes has to be 
used instead.  The reason is that they classify the regimes for countries during a calendar 
year.  In a year that the regimes or the parity changes, the yearly number will reflect a 
combination of both regimes.  In addition, they do not exclude the instability period, the 
initial period where the regime changes.  (This of course is just a problem with using   12
LYS’s classifications for purposes such as studying the effects of exchange rate regimes 
on the Asian crisis.  The LYS methodology can not be applied to any time period). 
 Taking the timing of shifts in regimes to consideration, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2002) provide a very useful reference on 153 individual country exchange rate 
classifications including historical chronologies from 1946-2001.  They classify the 
exchange rate arrangements into 14 categories based on descriptive statistics and 
chronologies.  These categories are no separate legal tender, preannouced peg or currency 
board arrangement, preannounced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +-2%, 
de facto peg, pre announced crawling peg, preannounced crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +-2%, de facto crawling peg, de facto crawling band that is narrower than 
or equal to +-2%, preannounced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +-2%, de 
facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +-5%, moving band that is narrower 
than or equal to +-2% ( i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time), 
managed floating, freely floating, and freely falling. 
13  
They use country histories to separate whether or not countries have dual or 
multiple rates or parallel markets.  If they do, they are classified exchange rate regimes 
using market-determined exchange rate data (from Pick’s currency yearbook, Pick’s 
Black MK year books, and Pick’s World Currency Report). When the exchange rate is 
unified, the IMF’s monthly data is used to classify the exchange rate regime.
14  Then they 
                                                 
13 They differentiate between pre-announced peg/crawling peg/ crawling band from de facto since the 
announcement can act as a channel that generates speculative attacks. However, this issue is open to 
question depending on the purpose. 
14 As Carmen and Rogoff (2002) noted on p. 18, the reason is that the official exchange rate data (from 
IMF) often give a wrong picture of the underlying monetary policy and the ability of the economy to adjust 
imbalance.  For example, if monetary policy is more lax than is consistent with maintaining the official 
exchange rate unchanged, one would expect the market-determined rate to start depreciating ahead of the 
official realignment.  When the official realignment occurs, it is simply a validation of what had previously 
transpired in the free market.   13
use the statistical measures of volatility to classify the regimes.  If the absolute monthly 
percent change in the exchange rate is equal to zero for 4 consecutive months or more, 
that episode is classified as a de facto peg if the exchange rate is unified.  To distinguish 
among pegs and bands, they calculate the probability that the monthly absolute percent 
exchange rate change remains within a one percent band over a rolling period.  If the 
probability is 80% or higher, then it is classified as a peg regime.  If the exchange rate has 
no drift, it is classified as a fixed parity; if there is a drift, it is labeled as a crawling peg; 
and if the exchange rate goes through period of both appreciation and depreciation, it is 
termed a moving peg. 
   They also distinguish between exchange rate arrangement that has high exchange 
rate volatility under low inflation floating regimes and other regimes that have high 
volatility due to high inflation.  If inflation is above 40%, the classify it under a “freely 
falling” category (with the exceptional cases when the market rate follows a confirmed 
preannounced regime: since a country that has inflation above 40% often adopted a 
crawling peg  as a nominal anchor).  They also classify an exchange rate as “free falling” 
for the cases where a crisis generates a sudden transition from a fixed regime to managed 
or independent float regime accompanied by a large depreciation.   
For countries that are not classified as peg/band and that are not included in the 
free falling category, Reinhart and Rogoff proxy the composite degree of exchange rate 
flexibility to distinguish between managed float and free float.
15  However, this degree is 
                                                 
15 The degree is e/ Pr (e<1%)where the numerator  is the mean absolute monthly percent change in the 
exchange rate over a rolling five-year period and the denominator is the probability of small changes. As 
we discussed earlier, they also note the problem of using variance measures that overstate the degree of 
exchange rate flexibility over the long periods when there are large devaluations.    14
based on the actual behavioral of exchange rate not the propensity to intervene in foreign 
exchange markets. 
Similar to Reinhard and Rogoff’s methodology of distinguishing among narrow 
peg, horizontal band, crawling peg, and crawling band, we must use at least two 
parameters to capture both in the rate of crawl and the width of the band around parity 
that are easily interpreted in terms of the institutional characteristics of exchange rate 
regimes. The coefficient of the country-specific time trend on the log of the bilateral 
exchange rate is a proxy for the rate of crawl.  The minimum and the maximum of the 
disturbance in the time trend regression is a proxy for a bandwidth.
16  The traditional 
narrow band peg of the Bretton Woods system would have a zero rate of crawl and a 
narrow band width.  A horizontal band would also have a zero rate of crawl but a 
substantial width.  A narrow band crawling peg could have a substantial rate of crawl but 
a low value for band width, while a crawling band would have substantial parameters for 
both.  It is clear that the first (narrow band) and fourth (crawling band) of these categories 
are more fixed and more flexible respectively than the middle two, but the appropriate 
ranking of the middle two on institutional grounds is ambiguous
17. Here behavioral 
classifications are needed. 
IV.  The Problem of Observations that are Undefined in the Exchange Market 
Pressure (EMP) Concept. 
In the EMP framework where government policies lean with rather than against 
the wind the concept of the propensity to intervene is not well defined, i.e. where reserve 
                                                 
16 To allow for soft bands we could substitute the edge highest and lowest disturbances in order to discount 
outliers.   15
declines occur during a period of currency appreciation or reserve increases during a 
period of depreciation.  A preliminary look at the data for several countries shows that 
these combinations occur fairly frequently.  When the series are detrended, the frequency 
of these wrong sign months tends to decline, but remains fairly common. One of the most 
striking examples is Uruguay during 1990-2001.  During this period, there is a clear trend 
in both exchange rate and reserves.  When those series are detrended, the number of 
wrong sign decreases (from 76 observations to 53, out of a total of 133).    
It is not easy to decide how these wrong sign observations should be treated.  
Wrong signs can be caused by imperfections in the reserve change proxy as well as by 
episodes of leaning with the wind or of extreme form of leaning against the wind.  Actual 
leaning with the wind in a downward direction is classic beggar thy neighbor policy and 
is discouraged by the IMF’s guidelines except for cases where a currency is judged to be 
seriously overvalued.  Leaning with the wind in the upward direction may be justified 
during periods in which country’s currencies are considered to have overdepreciated and 
previous reserve losses need to be recouped.  The aftermath of the Asian crisis is a 
prominent example of this phenomenon.  See Willett (2000). 
Where imperfect proxies are the cause of the wrong sign, the best solution would 
likely be to drop these observations.  With true leaning with the wind, one could argue 
either that this is a case of government management or that it should be considered as 
super flexibility.  Which interpretation is better may depend on the use to be made of the 
classification. 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Of course there is a problem of changes in both stated and behavioral regimes over time.  Both trends and 
propensities to intervene around trends can change.  We will pay considerable attention to attempting to 
identify such shifts in our analysis.   16
Wrong signs could also result from an extreme form of leaning against the wind, 
i.e., instead of allowing domestic currency to depreciate in the face of excess supply in 
the foreign exchange market, the government could actively appreciate the exchange rate.  
Likewise despite an excess demand in foreign exchange market, a mercantilist 
government could force down the exchange rate.  It would seem that these should be 
treated as cases of government management or of super fixity.  Thus depending on the 
cause of the wrong sign, it can be argued that a value of zero or one should be assigned or 
that the observation should be deleted. 
In general, we will not be able to distinguish between wrong sign observations 
due to imperfect proxies and those due to leaning with the wind or extreme forms of 
leaning against the wind.  Thus at least initially we propose to delete the observations.  It 
will likely prove useful to undertake some careful case studies for episodes where there 
are a number of wrong signs to see if some clues about the reasons can be discovered.   
Another approach has been suggested by Waymark (1997).  This involves using a 
full range of estimates from plus to minus infinity rather than the zero to one bounds that 
we discussed.  We see difficulties with Waymark’s approach, however.  Waymark (1997) 
relates the degree of exchange market intervention to the concept of exchange market 
pressure.  She defines the degree of intervention as the proportion of exchange market 
pressure absorbed by exchange market intervention. Waymark’s index has a range from -
∞ to +∞.  When the sign of changes in exchange rate and reserves is correct (Exchange 
rates depreciate and reserves decline), Waymark’s index has a range from 0 to 1, with 
values closer to 1 indicating higher degree of fixity. When the exchange rate changes are 
the same sign but have a greater absolute magnitude than the changes that would have   17
occurred in the case of no intervention, Waymark’s index is negative.   When the 
exchange rate appreciates (depreciates) with excess supply (demand) of domestic 
currency, Waymark’s index is greater than one.   
According to Waymark’s index, the interpretation of the degree of intervention in 
cases of wrong sign observations is questionable.  For example, consider two cases of 
domestic currency appreciation given the same excess demand on domestic currency and 
elasticity.  For simplicity, assuming the elasticity of excess demand in the foreign 
exchange market equals –1. In Case A the domestic currency appreciates 0.5 % and 
reserves decline by 2.5 %. In Case B the domestic currency appreciates 5% and reserves 
decline 7%.  With the same speculative pressure equaling to 2, Case A and case B will 
have a measured degree of intervention of 1.25 and 3.5 respectively.   From Waymark’s 
definition, the higher the index, the higher is the degree of intervention.  Therefore, case 
B is interpreted as having a greater degree of intervention than case A. However, if one 
considers the ratio of speculative pressure taken on reserves versus on the exchange rates, 
Case B has a lower degree of intervention than case A.  From this perspective, the 
absolute value greater than one of Waymark’s index should be interpreted as less 
intervention as the absolute values are closer to 1.   
Waymark estimates the bilateral intervention statistics to characterize exchange 
rate regimes for Canada over the period 1975-1990. The intervention statistics are the 
mean value of the degree over the entire sample periods. As stated in the previous 
paragraph, the value of the degree has a range from -∞ to +∞.  Since the mean value is 
calculated over sample periods, the overall high mean value can not be interpreted as a 
high degree of fixity in cases which the value of at least one sample period falls outside   18
the range of zero and one.  Therefore, it is rather difficult to determine the true level of 
the degree of intervention.  
Waymark estimates the mean value of Canada’s degree of intervention equaling 
to approximately 0.94.  Using the average time path of exchange rates (described in terms 
of different equation) resulted from the mean value of intervention, she interpreted the 
value of 0.94 as Canada adopted a “managed float” regimes since the Bank of Canada 
tried to “limit the quarter by quarter changes in the external value of Canadian dollar, 
while at the same time allowing the Canadian dollar to drift slowly towards its underlying 
value” (p.73).   
According to the convergence condition for the solution of difference equation, 
Waymark’s intervention statistics can be interpreted as when the absolute value of mean 
value of intervention is less than 1, the exchange rate policy is described as managed float 
since this range of value will allow for convergence to free-float equilibrium.  However, 
it does not say anything about how heavily the float is managed. 
V.  Two-Way Classifications Are Not Fine Enough 
One key issue is how many exchange rate categories to use.  Economists often 
talk of pegged versus flexible exchange rates.  For some purpose this may be useful, but 
it is not for consideration of the relationships between exchange rate regimes and 
currency crisis.  There clearly is a need to distinguish between fixed rates and hard pegs 
such as currency boards (even though there have not proven to be immune to speculative 
crises as Hong Kong and Argentina illustrate) and adjustable pegs such as the Bretton 
Woods regime.  One of the key issues concerning intermediate regimes in the extent to 
which crawling band can avoid crises.  With a two way classification it is unclear   19
whether they should more appropriately be leveled as flexible or pegged.  An example of 
this problem is given in the recent paper by Grier and Grier (2001) on the Asian crisis.  
They classify countries in samples as either peggers or floaters according to their 
exchange rate movements in the first two months of 1997.
18   For example, they classify 
Hungary and Venezuela as adopting floating regimes.  These countries, however, were 
following forward-looking crawling band systems. Therefore, the use of only a two-way 
classification leads them to lump together some crawling band and floating regimes.  
They also lump together some crawling peg and narrow peg regimes.  For example, they 
classify the crawling peg/band regimes in Brazil, Chile, and Korea as peg regimes.   
Following their approach to classification but using a different model of the 
fundamentals, a different indicator of crisis, and a somewhat different set of countries, we 
confirm their finding that pegged exchange rates contributed significantly to the Asian 
crisis.  However, when we use what we consider to be roughly equally plausible 
classification scheme that puts the Asian crawling bands into the flexible category, we 
find that the sign on flexible rates turns from negative to positive (although it losses its 
significance). See Nitithanprapas, Rongala and Willett (2002). 
Of course it is easy to criticize classifications as being too aggregative, but there 
is also the danger of making some many distinctions that they lose their analytical 
usefulness and/or end up yielding two few observations to reach solid generalizations. 
In general we find the new IMF classifications to be extremely useful for 
analytical purposes.  A likely exception, however, is the distinction between independent 
floating and managed floating.  The difference in these two categories described in the 
                                                 
18 A country is a pegger if its exchange rate was flat, or moved in a predetermined pattern.  If it moved in a 
non-predetermined pattern, a country is a floater.   20
IMF Annual Report is that under the “independent float” category, the exchange rate is 
market determined with any foreign exchange intervention aimed at moderating the rate 
of change and preventing undue fluctuations in the exchange rate, rather than at 
establishing a level for it. Under “managed float” category, the monetary authority 
influences the movements of the exchange rate through active intervention in the foreign 
exchange market without specifying, or precommitting to a preannounced path of 
exchange rate.
19 It is not clear to us that this is a useful distinction for analytical purposes.  
More fruitful we suspect would be to attempt to distinguish between lightly and heavily 
managed floats and to consider the degree to which intervention influences domestic 
monetary policy. 
 In his widely read paper on the unstable middle, Stanley Fischer (2001) uses a 
three way breakdown of regimes into hard fixes, flexible, and intermediate.  As a first cut 
to warn of the dangers of narrow band adjustable pegs, this was a very sensible strategy.  
For our more ambitious purposes of investigating the breath of the unstable middle, we 
must make more distinctions about categories of middle regimes, however. Once one 
moves beyond narrow band pegs, there are no completely unambiguous dividing lines for 
making analytically relevant distinction and even in this case the choice of how wide a 
narrow band can be is open to debate.
20   
VI Our  Initial  Strategy 
                                                 
19 See also Bofinger and Wollmershauser (2001) for discussion of a methodology to distinguish among 
“pure float”, “managed float”, and “independent float” categories.  They construct the index of floating as 
the ratio of the sum of effective changes in reserves to the sum of absolute changes in reserves.  When the 
value is close to plus or minus one, it can be considered as managed floating.  They interpret such value as 
a central bank has tried to influence the trend of exchange rate.  However this can be a misleading 
interpretation since they do not consider the behavior of the exchange rate. 
20 We are prepared to argue strongly that a five percent total band should be labeled narrow and the thirty 
percent total band width of the post crisis European Monetary System should not be.  This leaves a wide   21
Our basic strategy for classifying intermediate regimes is to start with several 
fairly broad categories and then try to develop finer distinctions within these as the data 
allows.  For our initial categories, we plan to use: 
1)  Hard Fixed 
2)  Narrow Band Sticky Pegs (the Dead Center) 
3)  Crawling pegs/bands
21 
4)  Heavily managed float  
5)  Lightly managed float 
Freely flexible exchange rates are, of course, the limiting case of lightly managed.  
We know of no case where a country has abstained completely from any intervention for 
a prolonged period of time, although US management over some periods has been 
extremely light, often going more than a year with no intervention. 
We should clarify that in this context we use management and intervention to 
refer only to official intervention in the foreign exchange market to prop up or push down 
a currency through the sale or purchase of foreign exchange.  Countries often use other 
policy tools such as interest rate policy to influence developments in their currency 
markets.
22 
                                                                                                                                                 
range, however.  We will start by making use of the IMF’s classification of horizontal bands to make the 
distinction. 
21 We will further try to distinguish between forward-looking crawling pegs/band (decelerated rate of 
crawl) and backward-looking ones (accelerated rate of crawl). 
22 It was traditionally assumed that interest rate defenses would be stronger under pegged rates, but there is 
strong evidence from recent experience that efforts to use monetary policy to limit depreciation under 
flexible rates are common – See Calvo and Reinhart (2002).  Nor does this necessary imply fear of floating 
as opposed to a rational application of OCA analysis. It can be argued that countries which score at 
intermediate levels on the OCA criteria should adopt flexible rates, but give more weight to exchange rate 
developments in the formulation of monetary policy, the more open in the economy-See Willett (2001).  
For these reasons we will not use the behavior of interest rates in our initial classification of regimes, 
although we do plan to make use of interest rate data in the construction of some of our crises indices.  
Interest rate behavior may prove to be important in the linkage of exchange rate and monetary policy.   22
Following the spirit of the new IMF classification and Reinhart and Rogoff 
[2002], we will also distinguish between formally announced and de facto regimes under 
the assumption that typically de facto regimes will be more flexible.  Under our category 
of heavily managed floats, we will in some cases be able to classify countries as 
following de facto crawling pegs or bands. 
Under our crawling pegs/bands category we will also include indication of crawls 
that are constant speed or variable speed and whether there are discrete adjustments along 
with the crawls.  For crawls that go in both directions over time, we adopt Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s terminology of movable bands. 
We also suspect that the stability of intermediate regimes will be related to the 
degree to which intervention to influence exchange rates is consistent with domestic 
macroeconomic policy See Willett (2002).   One aspect of this is the extent to which 
exchange market intervention is sterilized.  We hope to include work on this issue in a 
later stage of the project. 
We will also use institutional criteria to check our classification of exchange rate 
regimes.  For the purpose of studying the unstable middle hypothesis, however, it is 
crucial to distinguish between hard pegs (which are one corner solution) and narrow band 
pegs that can be adjusted (which represent the dead center of the middle from an analytic 
perspective).   This is a delineation that cannot be made on behavioral criteria without 
lapsing into tautology, i.e., defining a hard pegs as one that survives in tack and a soft or 
adjustable peg as one where partly adjustments are forced.  In this form, the unstable 
middle hypothesis would be tautologically true.  We will thus use institutional criteria   23
such as the legal difficulty of changing parity (this is greatest for common currencies and 
strong forms of currency boards).
23   
VII  Some Preliminary Empirical Results from our Exchange Rate Classifications 
Preliminary empirical results using our approach suggest that in some cases it 
yields substantially different results from other methodologies. An illustration is given in 
tables 2 and 3 which compare classifications from our approach with those of the IMF 
LYS, and Reinhart and Rogoff for a number of countries prior to the Mexican and Asian 
crises.  (For the latter Grier and Grier’s classifications are included as well).  For 
example, Our initial judgment, LYS and Reinhart and Rogoff classify Malaysia during 
1997 as employing a float regime, while Grier and Grier (2001) classify it as adopting a 
peg regime.  In addition, LYS classify Korea during 1996 as adopting fixed regime, while 
we as well as Reinhart and Rogoff classify it as adopting crawling peg regimes.  The 
classification of Korea before Mexican crisis is unclear.  If we consider the period 92-95, 
Korea seems to adopt a narrow peg regime.  However, if only period 94 is used, it seems 
to adopt a crawling peg regime. Classifications using different methodologies also yield 
different results for India.  Grier and Grier (2001) and Carmen and Reinhart classify India 
during 1997 as adopting a peg regime, while LYS classify it as employing a floating 
regime. 
                                                 
23 There will of course be some gray areas in this type of classification.  For example, Austria is widely 
believed to have adopted a hard peg to the German DM although this was due to the strength of public 
commitments to a hard peg rather than formal legislation.  On the other hand while maintaining a fairly 
rigid peg for a number of years, the government of the Czech Republic did not commit to maintaining the 
peg.  For a valuable analysis of the effects of different degrees of commitment to pegs see Cukierman et al 
(1995).  On the Austrian peg see Hochreiter and Winckler (1995) and on the Czech peg see Hrncir (1999) 
and Burdekin, Nelson, and Willett (1999).   24
In tables 2 and 3, LYS refers to the classification by LYS. They divide the 
exchange rate regimes into 5 groups: inconclusive, flexible, dirty float, crawling peg 
(CP), and fixed.  “Coeff trend” Column shows the coefficient of the country-specific time 
trend on the log of bilateral exchange rate (using our judgement). It is a proxy for the rate 
of crawl.  If the error of this regression has the maximum or minimum less than 1 
percent, we consider it as a peg regime.   The maximum and minimum of the disturbance, 
the absolute percent change in exchange rate, the standard deviation of percent change in 
exchange rate, the standard deviation of percent change in reserves, and the degree of 
intervention is calculated over the period 1994m1-1994 m10 as reported on table 2 and 
over the period 1996m1-1997m5 as reported on table 3.  The degree of intervention is 
calculated using both variance and average measures.   The degree of intervention using 
the variance measure is  1-[σ
2 ∆E/ (σ
2 ∆E + σ
2 ∆R)].  The degree of intervention using 
the average measure is the mean value of 1-[absolute ∆E/ (absolute ∆E + absolute ∆R)]  
for the period of considerations.  We also calculate the degree of intervention over correct 
sign observations.  If there is a time trend in exchange rates and/or reserves, we use 
detrended changes in these variables instead of the changes themselves.   
The degree of intervention falls within the range of zero and one.  The 
intervention is heavily managed when the value is closer to one.  As explained earlier, we 
can not interpreted 0.5 as the mid-point.   
In our measures the country’s bilateral nominal exchange rate against the dollar is 
used.  The calculations will also be redone using effective exchange rates. 
24 From the 
standpoint of studying the relationships between exchange rate regimes and currency   25
crises both may be relevant.  (This is an issue which needs more attention).  Of  course 
for some countries the dollar should be replaced with other major currencies. 
VIII  Regime Changes as Trend Changes   
The use of our approach highlights issues of the time periods used for analysis 
and the problems of change in trends. Consider the case of Singapore.  Looking at the 
behavior of the exchange rate over the whole 1990-1997 period, one would be likely to 
classify it as having a fairly flexible regime.  However, we find only a small movement of 
exchange rate during 1996-1997 before the Asian crisis.  From this perspective, 
Singapore seems to have abandoned a managed float before the crisis.  It could be 
possible that during 1996, Singapore had few shocks so that nominal exchange rate did 
not have to move.  Here, our intervention coefficient and the coefficient of time trend 
may help classifying exchange rate regimes. There is a change in trends in exchange rate 
during 1995 August. On average, Singapore had an intervention coefficient of 0.6 during 
1996 with a downward trend of 0.001.  In comparison the intervention coefficient during 
1994, was 0.4 with a downward trend of 0.004.  Hence, during 1996, Singapore appears 
to have adopted a less flexible regime as is shown in the following chart, after 
considerably greater flexibility immediately after the crisis, the degree of variability 
began to decline again. This issue of post crisis changes in flexibility will be discussed 
further in the next section.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 Using nominal effective rate may yield different classifications from using bilateral exchange rate.  For 
example, while Brazil can be classified as adopting crawling peg using bilateral exchange rate, it can be 
considered as employing horizontal bands using nominal effective rates during 1997.   26

















































IX  Post-crisis Exchange Rate Policies in the Asian Crisis Countries 
  It is fairly clear that the immediate result of the Asian crisis was a switch to highly 
flexible exchange rates for most of the hardest hit countries.  The fear of floating 
hypothesis predicts that this shift would only be temporary, however, and that over time 
many countries would begin to more heavily manage their exchange rate again.  This has 
certainly been the case for Malaysia that formally adopted a new narrow band pegged 
regime in September 1998.  There have also been numerous reports of more recent moves 
to greatly increased official management in Korea and Thailand.
25   
                                                 
25 This perceived change for Thailand is widely believed to have resulted from the change in Governor of 
the Thai central bank which occurred in May 2001.   27
  The major study so far of post crisis exchange rate policies in Asia is by 
Hernandez and Montiel (2001).  Based on the data within twenty-four month after 
January 1999 to twenty four month thereafter, they conclude using their measure of the 
ratio of exchange rate volatility to reserve volatility that “For Korea and Thailand, the 
post crisis period was relatively tranquil one.  These countries moved to substantially 
greater exchange rate flexibility in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period, 
though they appear to manage their bilateral exchange rates against the U.S. Dollar to a 
significantly greater extent than have industrial-country “pure floaters”.  
Over the eighteen months after 1999, Korea and Thailand’s exchange rates moved 
approximately 10 percent compared with the 20-30 percent range for Germany and 
Japan.  Hernandez and Montiel calculate the degree of exchange rate flexibility, which 
has a range from zero to infinity, by comparing the volatility of exchange rate with the 
volatility of reserves using the data within twenty-four months after 1999. They find that 
Korea and Thailand had degrees of exchange rate flexibility of 1.44 and 1.26 respectively 
where as Japan and Germany had degrees of exchange rate flexibility of 0.85 and 1.98 
respectively. We calculate the degree of exchange rate flexibility using the data within 
eighteen months after 1999.  Our index, which has a range between zero and one, is the 
average value of the average value of the ratio of percentage change in exchange rates to 
sum of the percentage change in reserves, plus the percentage change in the exchange 
rate.  We find that Korea and Thailand have degrees of exchange rate flexibility of 0.54 
and 0.58 respectively where as Japan and Germany (Euro) have degrees of exchange rate 
flexibility of 0.58 and 0.44 respectively. Our measures of the degree of exchange rate 
flexibility indicate that Korea and Thailand had a similar degree of exchange rate   28
flexibility as Japan but a greater degree of exchange rate flexibility than Germany 
(EURO).   On the other hand, Hernandez and Montiel found that Korea and Thailand had 
a greater degree of exchange rate flexibility than Japan, but less than Germany. 
To investigate the hypothesis that Korea and Thailand have begun to manage their 
exchange rate much more heavilty, we look at the behavior of exchange rates and 
reserves over the period September 2001 to March 2002 for Thailand and January 2001 
to March 2002 for Korea.  We find that during those periods exchange rates moved 
within a relatively narrow range compared with 1999-2000.  Our measure of exchange 
rate flexibility shows that Thailand had exchange rate flexibility of 0.33 during 2001-
2002. This is substantially less than the degree of 0.58 during 1999-2000.  However 
Korea’s degree of exchange rate flexibility of 0.62 during 2001-2002 was little different 
from the degree of 0.58 during 1999-2000. 
For Indonesia and the Philippines, Hernandez and Montiel conclude that “the 
post-crisis period has proved to be more turbulent in foreign exchange markets than the 
pre-crisis one.  These countries have responded by allowing the exchange rate to move, 
by intervening in foreign exchange markets, as well as by using domestic policies to 
defend the value of the exchange rate.  However, the relative weight placed on exchange 
rate movements as endogenous responses to shocks increased greatly in the post-crisis 
period, implying that these countries, like Korea and Thailand, have also moved toward 
more flexible exchange rate regimes.  However, like Korea and Thailand as well, they 
have targeted the exchange rate to an extent that appears to be substantially greater than 
practiced in the industrial country “pure floaters” (p.15 :Version March 2001)”.   29
During the eighteen months after 1999, Indonesia’s exchange rate moved 
substantially.  The range was 33 %, which is higher than the 25% and 18% ranges for 
Germany and Japan respectively. The Phillipines’ exchange rate moved within a 14  
percent range, which is lower than for Germany and Japan. Hernandez and Montiel find 
that the Philippines has a smaller degree of exchange rate flexibility (0.65) than both 
Germany (1.98) and Japan (0.85).   We find similar results that Indonesia has a degree of 
0.37 which is greater than the degrees in Japan (0.58) and in Germany (0.44).
26  
 
X  Ranking Intermediate Degrees of Flexibility and Creating Indices of 
Flexibility. 
  Several papers have developed rankings of different degrees of flexibility.  In 
most cases such rankings are clear cut, but some cases seem to us to be more ambiguous 
than previous authors have noted.  For example, how should a wide band with a slow rate 
of crawl be rated against a narrow band with a rapid crawl?  As argued above we believe 
that we do not have any good way at present to develop a coefficient to translate between 
rates of change and variability around such trends.  
  Even where we can agree on ordinal rankings, there may be important difference 
in the behavioral distances between categories and of course the appropriate distances 
may vary depending on the purpose.  Thus, for example, in Reinhart and Rogoff’s fine 
grid there is likely little distance between preanounced crawling band that is wider than 
or equal to 2 percent (rank 9) and de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to 
5 percent (rank10) respectively (and indeed some version of the latter might be more 
                                                 
26 It is noted that our degree of exchange rate flexibility of Germany is relatively lower   30
flexible than the former).  Likewise the differences in going from pre-announced 
horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to 2 percent (rank 3) to no separate legal 
tender (rank 1) would seem likely to be much more greater than from pre-announced 
crawling band that is wider than or equal to 2 percent (rank 9) to de facto crawling peg 
(rank 7). 
XI Concluding  Remarks 
  This paper suggests a methodology for classifying exchange rate regimes, 
compares it with other measures, and discussed a number of problems of implementation. 
Where meaningful official descriptions of exchange rate regimes are not formally 
announced, there can be important gray areas where the best exact characterization is 
unclear. This problem is particularly acute in cases of small changes in de facto regimes. 
  We highlight the issue of trends and argue that at least two parameters – 
coefficients for trend and for deviations around trend – are necessary for the general 
classification of exchange rate regimes. Because of shifting trends issues of changes in 
regimes and the appropriate time periods for analysis become important. There is likely 
no single best answer to such issues and the best answer is often likely to vary depending 
on the question at hand. We agree with LYS that researchers should be willing to make 
use of the ambiguous category when classifying regimes. (Typically this will be 
ambiguous with respect to classification between two particular categories, not complete 
uncertainty about the regime). 
  The lack of full correspondence between changes is reserves and actual exchange 
market intervention is a major problem. We emphasize the frequency with which the data 
                                                                                                                                                 
than those reported in Hernandez and Montiel paper.   31
on changes in exchange rates do not fit within the leaning against the wind framework 
implied by the concept of exchange market pressure. How to classify such “wrong sings” 
observations is especially problematic. We believe one path to progress is careful country 
studies which investigate these wrong sign observations and attempt to gain insight into 
the extent to which these results from actual intervention behavior versus weaknesses in 
changes in reserves as a proxy for intervention. The role of official borrowing in this 
regard will also be important to study. 
  In closing, we should raise another important dimension of classification. This is 
the extent to which monetary policy is adjusted to external considerations. The extent to 
which intervention is sterilized or not should have important implications for the stability 
of exchange rate regimes (see Willett (2002)). Thus we ultimately need to be concerned 
not with exchange rate regimes per se, but with monetary crisis exchange rate regimes. 
The inclusion of sterilization measures and/or interest rate behavior in such broader 
classifications is an important area for further research.
27 
  
                                                 
27 see, for example, Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Hernandez and Montiel (2001), and 
McCauley (2001).   32
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